A simulation model of international tourist flows is used to estimate the impact of a carbon tax on aviation fuel. The effect of the tax on travel behaviour is small: A global tax of $1000/t C would change travel behaviour and reduce carbon dioxide emissions from international aviation by 0.8%. A carbon tax on aviation fuel would particularly affect long-haul flights, because of high emissions, and short-haul flights, because of the emission during take-off and landing. Medium distance flights would be affected least. This implies that tourist destinations that rely heavily on short-haul flights or on intercontinental flights will see a decline in international tourism numbers, while other destinations may see international arrivals rise. If the tax is only applied to the European Union, tourists would stay closer to home and European tourism would grow at the expense of other destinations. Sensitivity analyses reveal that the qualitative insights are robust.
Introduction
Transport is responsible for a large portion of carbon dioxide emissions, and its emissions are growing faster than those from other sources.
1 Moreover, emission reduction appears to be more difficult and more expensive in transport than it is in other sectors, particularly power generation (Schaefer and Jacoby, 2005) . International aviation is the fastest growing part of transport and it is more difficult to regulate than domestic transport, inter alia because it is outside the jurisdiction of a single country. Should abatement be successful for power generation and domestic transport, the increasing emissions from international aviation would stand out (Pridmore et al., 2003) and pressure to reduce emissions would increase. We investigate the potential contribution of emission reduction from international aviation.
Initially it is assumed that a group of countries will be able to agree on a tax on kerosene although there is no assumption about which countries will participate. The European Union (EU), particularly at the initiative chosen. Fourth, tourist numbers per country are computed. A tax on aviation fuel in international travel would primarily affect the third model stage.
Data and interpolation
Data on international arrivals and departures for 1995 are taken from the World Resources Databases (http://earthtrends.wri.org). There are two limitations with this data. Firstly, for some countries, the data is for arrivals and departures for tourism only. For other countries, the data are arrivals and departures for all purposes. Unfortunately, it is impossible to correct for this. Secondly, there are missing observations, particularly with regard to departures. For arrivals, about 2% of data are missing. For departures, this is 18%. The interpolation details are given in Appendix.
For most countries, the volume of domestic tourist flows is derived using 1997 data contained in the Euromonitor (2002) database. For some other countries, alternative sources are used, such as national statistical offices, other governmental institutions or trade associations; see Bigano et al. (2004) . Data are mostly in the form of number of trips to destinations beyond a non-negligible distance from the place of residence, and involve at least one overnight stay. For some countries, data in this format were not available, and either the number of registered guests in hotels, campsites, hostels, etc., or the ratio between the number of overnight stays and the average length of stay was used. The latter underestimate domestic tourism by excluding trips to friends and relatives; nevertheless, such data are included for completeness. Details on the interpolation are given in Appendix.
For number of tourists, the world aggregate is 12.0% higher if the interpolated tourist numbers are included. The observed world total includes those countries for which there are observations for domestic tourists and international arrivals. For domestic tourists only, the observations add to 3.1 billion tourists, and 3.5 billion tourists with interpolation, a 12.1% increase.
For international tourism, the matrix of bilateral flows of tourists from one country to the next is needed. This matrix is largely unobserved. To build this matrix, Eq. (1) is multiplied by the distance (km) between the capital cities raised to the distance elasticity, and the tourists from a particular country to all other countries are allocated proportional to the result. This procedure delivers results for the base year 1995. For other years, a similar approach is used. 
where A i i is the arrivals in country i from country j; D j i is the great-circle distance between the two countries; y i is per capita income in the destination country; T i is the annual average temperature in the destination country; H i is the number of world heritage sites per million square kilometers in the destination country; C i is the length of the coast line of the destination country; A i is the land area of the destination country; and S i is an index of the political stability of the destination country.
According to Eq. (1), international tourists prefer to stay closer to home, as this reduces travel cost and travel time. Bigano et al. (2006) find that the distance elasticity is closer to zero -that is, distance matters less -if people get richer. Re-estimating this relationship including the 1979 data (Senior, 1982) 
For an income of $23,000 (as in the UK in 2002), for instance, the distance elasticity is À0.73. This is towards the lower end of the range in Oum et al. (1990) .
Travel costs
Eq.
(1) has distance, but tourists are deterred by the cost and duration of travel. However, at an aggregate scale, data on travel cost and travel time are impossible to get. Indeed, it is even difficult to get such data at a micro-level (Lise and Tol, 2002) . As an approximation, travel time and cost for flights from London to the capitals of the world were collected. Only direct flights were included. The cost was the cheapest offer on www.expedia.com, for a flight two months in the future, including a weekend at destination. Travel time correlates very well with distance. One needs 47 min for take-off and landing (on paper), and needs 4 s/km (875 km/h). The R 2 is 99.5%. The data on travel cost is noisier. On average, one pays $30 to get in the plane, and 14 cents/km. The R 2 is only 70.0%. These two linear equations were used to derive travel time and travel cost from the distances that were in the previous versions of the model. The previous model version had an income-dependent distance elasticity. Travel time and travel cost elasticities are derived as follows. The time and price elasticities are arbitrarily assumed to have the same value (À0.45) for UK citizens. The value is chosen such that the travel patterns of the British based on time and cost closely mimics that based on distance, based on least squares. The time elasticity is assumed to be constant, but the price elasticity varies with income. It is calibrated so that the travel behaviour for the time and cost model is close (least squares) to that for the distance model for people with an income one-tenth of the UK average. The cost elasticity then equals À1.50 + 0.14 ln y.
Emissions
Pearce and Pearce (2000) report carbon dioxide emissions per type of plane and length of trip, and such emissions can also be computed from the data presented in Wit et al. (2002) . Take-off and landing are energy-intensive compared to cruising, so short trips emit more carbon per kilometre than do long trips. The average plane of Pearce and Pearce (2000) emits about the same as the average plane of Wit et al. Emissions per plane were transformed to emissions per passenger using the higher occupancy rates of Wit et al. This implies 6.5 kg C per passenger for take-off and landing, and 0.02 kg per passenger-kilometre. The resulting carbon dioxide emissions per trip are very similar to those found on www.climatecare.org, the site at which one can buy emission offsets.
Total emissions follow from multiplying emissions per passenger-kilometre by the number of passengerkilometres. No holidays at less than 500 km distance (one way) are assumed to be by air, and all holidays beyond 5000 km are assumed to be by air; in between the fraction increases linearly with distance. For island nations, the respective distance are 0 and 500 km. Total emissions in 2000 are 140 million metric tonnes of carbon, which is 2.1% of the total emissions from fossil fuels. This is from tourism only. Total international aviation is reckoned to be responsible for some 3% of global emissions. There are no published numbers on the share of tourism in international travel.
Results
In the base case, the effect of a kerosene tax on international tourist travel is investigated for the year 2010 for three alternative taxes: $10/t C, $100/t C and $1000/t C, 10 using the parameters as described above. The tax is applied at global level, for the Annex 1 11 countries, for the countries of the EU and its affiliates, and for the EU only. Fig. 1 shows the change in the world total of passenger-kilometres, and the change in total carbon emissions if the tax is applied globally. For a $1000/t C kerosene tax, international tourism travel falls by about 0.8% and the associated carbon dioxide emissions fall by 0.9%. There are a number of reasons for the result on emissions. Firstly, the number of travellers stays the same. Secondly, although shorter trips are generally favoured over longer ones, if there is little alternative to flying, medium-distance trips actually become more attractive relative to short trips. Thirdly, the price elasticity is assumed to be low. Fourthly, the price change is low: $73 for a 1000 km roundtrip, for example. This less than doubles the air fare, even for a very high tax.
The difference between the change in travel distance and the change in carbon dioxide emissions is due to a shift from air travel to other modes on the one hand, and to the large emissions of take-off and landing on the other hand. Fig. 2 shows the change in the number of international arrivals for the countries that are most affected in an absolute sense (Hong Kong, UK) and in a relative sense (Cyprus, South Korea). Results are also shown for Ireland. Hong Kong and South Korea benefit from a shift of East and Southeast Asian tourists away from destinations in Europe and North America and towards the own region; in absolute terms, tourists from China and Japan rise most. Cyprus, Ireland and the UK suffer from being on the fringe of Europe as well as being island nations. and Eastern Europe gain -from each other's custom but also from redirect Scandinavian and British travel. Interestingly, the countries that neighbour China and India all gain -a sign of the growing importance of these two countries in international tourism. The kerosene tax is assumed global; this is unlikely. As an alternative, the tax is applied to the Annex I countries, the EU plus its affiliates, and the EU only. The tax is implemented as a departure fee, covering the entire one-way flight.
12 As all trips are assumed to be roundtrips, it does not matter whether it is a departure fee or a landing fee. 13 The landing fee is paid twice on flights from an Annex 1 country to another Annex 1 country, once on flights from or to an Annex 1 country, and not on flights from and to a non-Annex I country.
The $1000/t C global kerosene tax reduces carbon dioxide emissions in 2010 by 0.81% of the projected 2010 emissions without a tax. If applied to Annex 1 countries only, this falls to 0.40%; for the EU plus, this is 0.21%; for the EU, 0.19%. As Europe has such a large share of international tourist travel, this is as expected. 12 One may question the legality of taxing emissions in another country's airspace, as this may violate the Chicago Convention. On the other hand, the atmosphere is the common property of mankind. 13 A departure (landing) fee would be an export (import) tax based on the carbon-content of the flight service. Export taxes are easier to defend under World Trade Organization rules than are import taxes. Fig. 4 shows the effect on travel patterns. An EU tax would divert European travellers from the USA, Africa, and the Middle East to Europe. The Americas would benefit from US citizens not travelling to Europe. South Asia, East Asia, and Australasia would benefit from tourists diverted from Europe. Iceland, Ireland and the UK lose market share because they are heavily dependent on airborne tourists. Norway and Switzerland, even though exempt from the tax, lose market share, Norway because it is relatively remote, Switzerland because it is central and therefore sees a relatively high price increase. Fig. 4 also displays the difference between the global tax and the EU. The EU would lose a share of the market in international tourism, but so would countries that disproportionally rely on European visitors, such as Pakistan, South Korea and Japan. The rest of the world, including Norway and Switzerland, would gain.
Sensitivity analyses
There are a large number of parameters in HTM. All of them are uncertain and affect the impact of kerosene taxation on carbon dioxide emissions; yet, some are more uncertain than others, and some have a greater effect. The sensitivity analysis is limited to the most important parameters.
The parameters that govern the modal choice for international tourist travel are as per my guess, based on some travel experience and casual observations. If aviation has a larger (smaller) share of international tourism travel, then total emissions would rise (fall). The most important parameter is the distance above which 100% of travel is by aeroplane. If this were twice the base value, emissions would be 14% lower. Emission reduction responds with the opposite sign: If aviation has a larger (smaller) share of international tourism travel, then emission reductions are smaller (larger) for the same carbon tax. This is because modal shift is more (less) effective. However, if the distance below which no travel by air is raised, this pattern is broken. This is because many more destinations are within a 1000 km reach than with a 500 km reach. The carbon tax would then have a greater impact on destination choice. If modal choice were endogenous rather than driven by a set of fixed parameters, then the effect of a carbon tax would be larger as tourists would switch travel mode as well as destination to reduce their travel costs.
If all international tourist travel were by plane, carbon dioxide emissions were more than twice as high (Table 1) . In this case, a $1000/t C would increase emissions. This is because tourists are assumed to make their destination choice based on the relative attractiveness of destinations. Because of the high emissions of take-off and landing, nearby destinations face a greater relative price increase than destinations that are further afield -so that tourists travel farther and emit more. This implies that, in the base case, emission reductions are achieved by combination of shorter travel and model shift. Table 1 also shows the case in which the carbon tax is proportional to the distance travelled. Technically, carbon emissions from take-off and landing are set to zero; and per-kilometre emissions are re-calibrated so that global emissions are as in the base case. Under this assumption, short trips are not disadvantaged relative to medium-distance trips. Indeed, emissions fall further than in the base case, by 0.95% for a $1000/t C tax.
The price elasticity is important. It is also very uncertain. The survey of Oum et al. (1990) reveals a wide range of estimates. The price elasticity used here is a result of calibration rather than estimation. In the calibration, it is assumed that, for the UK, the travel cost elasticity and the travel time elasticity have the same value. This is arbitrary. The model was recalibrated so that the price elasticity equals two times and four times the time elasticity. The price elasticity then increases from 0.45 (base case) to 0.58 (twice) and 0.68 (four times) for a country with the average income of the UK.
14 For a country with an average income one-tenth of the UK's, the price elasticities are 0.88, 0.95, and 1.01. Table 1 shows the results. Recalibration has little impact on total carbon dioxide emissions in the case without a kerosene tax. There is also little effect on travel patterns (results not shown). Fig. 1 shows that, as expected, the higher the price elasticity, the stronger the emission reduction for any given kerosene tax. Table  1 shows that emission reduction more than doubles for the very high price elasticity compared to the base case, but even so a $1000/t C would cut emissions by only 1.7%.
The demand for international travel is not affected by the kerosene tax, at least in the base case. To test the sensitivity of this, the average travel cost of international tourism with and without tax is computed and, with the price elasticity of the base case, used to reduce the demand for international holidays; domestic holidays are the substitute. This is probably an overestimate, as a tourist may well compare the costs of foreign and domestic holidays, and a foreign holiday may be considered as a status good. At the same time, the base case allows for no substitution at all. Fig. 1 and Table 1 show the results. The effect is large: a €1000/t C tax would cut emissions by 7.6%, eight times larger than in the base case. However, this is a very large tax, while emission reduction is still small. For a €10/t C tax, emissions fall by 0.1%; for a €100/t C tax, emissions fall by 0.9%.
Besides carbon dioxide, planes also emit nitrogen oxides and water vapour. Both contribute to warming, but the effect is regional and situation-specific. An equivalence to CO 2 has therefore not been established (Ramaswamy et al., 2001) . A uniform, global tax would be an inappropriate instrument, but no formal sensitivity analysis was performed. However, the consequences can be gleaned. Compared to CO 2 , emissions of NO x are even more concentrated during start and landing. An NO x tax would imply that short-haul flights are hit extra hard. For water vapour, the opposite is true. Cruising is more important than take-off and landing. Williams and Noland (2006) suggest that water vapour emissions may be ten times as important as carbon dioxide emissions. If that is true, a $1000/t C tax is conceivable.
The model omits behavioural and technical measures for reducing carbon dioxide emissions, such as changes in taxiing, take-off and landing; changing in aircraft occupancy; upgraded engines; and the use of light-weight materials. As traveller behaviour is not very responsive to the limited price signals that carbon taxation would bring about, behavioural and technical changes may contribute more to emission reduction. If such measures would be implemented rationally, air fares would rise less. This would further limit the response of travellers.
Conclusion
The analysis suggests that kerosene tax would induce a shift from long flights to medium distance one, a shift from medium distance flights to short distance car and train holidays, and a shift from short flights to medium distance ones. Island nations would be disproportionally hit by a kerosene tax. If the tax is applied regionally rather than globally, then the taxed region loses market share to the non-taxed region. Emissions Note: In the base case, all trips longer than 5000 km (max) are by aeroplane and no trips shorter than 500 km (min). For island nations, min = 0 and max = 500. For ''no modal shift'', all distance parameters equal nought.
would fall only by a small amount, even if the kerosene tax would be very high because a kerosene tax would raise the cost of flying by only a limited amount. Put differently, very high kerosene taxes would be needed to substantially reduce carbon dioxide emissions from international aviation. Emission reduction can be had elsewhere for much less money.
There are a number of caveats to these results. There is extensive interpolation of the data that drive the model. Past relationships are assumed to hold for the future. Seasonality is ignored, and there is no distinction between different travel purposes; business travel is omitted. The model does not allow for technical measures to reduce emissions. This implies that emission reductions are underestimated. It also implies that the estimate travel response is overestimated. The model does not allow for substitution between domestic and international holidays, or indeed between holidays and no holidays. As the estimated effect on international travel is only small, this is probably not a major shortcoming. Similarly, the model does not allow for explicit modal shifts -although modal shift is implicit. The sign of the introduced bias is unknown. Furthermore, the results depend to a large extent on the assumed travel price elasticity of tourism demand -and on the assumed travel costs. Both are uncertain. The model does not differentiate between regular and discount airlines, again for the want of data. Discount airlines would face the same kerosene taxes, and therefore experience a higher relative price increase. Finally, the model ignores emissions of water vapour, a potent greenhouse gas. 
where A denotes total arrivals, G is land area (km 2 ); T is annual average temperature from 1961-1990 (°C) averaged over the country, C is the length of coastline (km), and Y is per capita income; d indexes the country of destination. This model is the best fit to the observations for the countries for which there are data. The total number of tourists increases from 55.2 million (observed) to 56.5 million (observed plus modelled). The 26 missing observations constitute only 2% of the international tourism market.
For departures, the data problem is more serious: 107 countries report but 99 do not; 46.5 million departures are reported, against 56.5 million arrivals, so that 18% of all international tourists have an unknown origin. The missing observations were filled with a statistical model, viz., 
where D denotes departures, P denotes population in thousands, and B is the number of countries with shared land borders; o indexes the country of origin. This model is the best fit to the observations for the countries for which there are data. This leads to a total number of departures of 48.2 million, so all departures were scaled by 17% so that the total number of observed and modelled departures equals the total number of observed and modelled arrivals. The missing observations for domestic tourists were filled using two regressions. Total tourist numbers, D + H, where H is the number of domestic tourists, were interpolated using 
People may take a holiday more than once a year but as population is measured in thousands, the parameters imply that people with an income of $10,000 per person per year take one holiday per year. The ratio of domestic to total holidays was interpolated using 
The individual temperature parameters are not statistically significant from zero at the 5% level, but they are jointly significant. Observations for 1995 were derived from 1997 observations by dividing the latter by the population and per capita income growth between 1995 and 1997, correcting the latter for the income elasticity of Eqs. (A3, and A4). The income elasticity of domestic holidays is positive for countries with low incomes but falls as income grows and eventually goes negative. Qualitatively, this pattern is not surprising. In very poor countries, only the upper income class have holidays and they prefer to travel abroad, also because domestic holidays may be expensive too. As a country gets richer, the middle-income class have holidays; initially cheap, domestic vacations. The share of domestic in total vacations only starts to fall if the lower income class are rich enough to afford a holiday abroad; with the estimates of Eq. (A4), this happens if average income exceeds $360,000, a high number. In previous versions of the model, equations for interpolation were also used for extrapolation. HTM, version 1.3, deviates from this practice because new data and new results became available. Bigano et al. (2006) , for example, shed new light on preferences for holiday destinations (Table A1) . Data for the 1970s can be found in Senior (1982) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1989) , sources that were previously overlooked. These data provide the opportunity to improve the calibration of the dynamic features of HTM.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1989) contains data on domestic and foreign holidays, for some countries as far back as 1972. Combined with the data of Bigano et al. (2004) , this gives a reasonable time series. The natural logarithm of the ratio of domestic to total holidays was regressed on the natural logarithm of per capita income. Table A2 has the results. The mean income elasticity is À0.10 (0.01). This is used in the base case. The temperature sensitivity of Eq. (A2) is used implying that the domestic-to-international ratio is maximized at 18°C. The ratio of Eq. (A4) is not necessarily less than unity; the ratio of domestic to total tourists is restricted to lie between 0.01 and 0.99. HTM is a static model implying that it can be run backwards in time, as well as forwards. For validation purposes, the model was run for the period 1980-1995. Fig. A1 shows modelled and observed international arrivals for 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 . The model reproduces the data very well; the R 2 is at least 90%. Fig. A2 shows modelled and observed international arrivals. The model fit is less impressive, but does not fall Fig. A1 . International tourist arrivals as observed and as modelled in 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 (from left to right and from top to bottom). below 73%. Fig. A3 shows the ratio of domestic to total holidays for 1980 and 1995; there are no comprehensive data available for intermediate years. The model fit is impressive for the calibration year, but for 1980, the R 2 is only 64%. A glance at Table A2 shows the reason. Different countries have had different trends in the structure of their holidays, while the model uses a common trend for all. 
